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INTRODUCTION 
 
Enacting legislation is not a simple task. Intricacies become double fold in jurisdictions 
where legislation is enacted in multiple languages. It gives rise to complicated questions of 
statutory interpretation which is amplified by discrepancies between various versions of a 
piece of legislation.1  
 
To interpret legislation in general is to assign the meaning to a word, phrase or legislative 
sentence. Where there is a possibility of having two or more meaning, to decide between 
them or to declare the definite meaning. It is the taking of the decision on applicability or non 
applicability of a piece of legislation to a particular situation.2 Judges and practicing lawyers 
are most specifically involved in the interpreting of legislation.3A part from judges and 
lawyers, statutory interpretation directly or indirectly involves all those who are affected by 
the legislation.4 Interpreting multilingual legislation involves matching the closest possible 
linguistic equivalent in all the versions of a piece of legislation. 
 
 The problem arises because words change or loose meaning in the process of translation. As 
Alcaraz states, “Words strain, crack and sometimes break under the burden, under the 
tension, slip, slide perish, decay with imprecision, will stay in place, will not stay still”.5 In 
one jurisdiction, only one version may be authentic while others are merely official 
translations. In other jurisdiction, all versions of the legislation may be authentic. The 
rationale of more than one authentic language is brought about by the fact that in some 
jurisdictions there is a presumption that language texts are identical in meaning.6 
 
The approach of interpreting legislation expressed in two or more not so compatible versions 
is more complex than the approach of a unilingual construed legislation.7 In multilingual 
                                                            
1 Donald L. Revell, “Authoring Bilingual Laws: The Importance of Process” (2003-2004)29 Brook. J. Int'l L, 
1085 < htt://heinonline.org>.  
2 “Attorney General’s Department Report. Symposium on Statutory Interpretation” (1983) Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Canberra, 96. 
3 Enrique Alcaraz and Bran Hughes. Legal translation explained (St Jerome publishing 2007)24. 
4 Attorney General’s Department Report (n 2)96. 
5 Alcaraz and Hudges (n 3)24. 
6 Christopher B. Kuner “The interpretation of multilingual treaties: comparison of texts versus the presumption 
of similar meaning” (1991) I.C.L.Q. 40(4), 953-964 <http:login.westlaw.co.uk.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk>. 
7 Michael Beaupre. Interpreting bilingual legislation (Carswell1986) 4. 
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drafting environment, problems stem from the tendency to use the same word in several 
languages even when the meaning of the word significantly differs from one language to 
another.8 Other challenges in the multilingualism include the fact that when interpreting the 
legislation, there should be no distinction between words in the text of the statute and the 
words in the legislative history.9  
 
Since translators translate legal ideas from one language to another, interpreters of 
multilingual legislation are bound to consider that knowledge of one version alone is 
insufficient point of reference to the idea in question. They ought to grasp the meaning of 
words or phrases at both textual and contextual levels of each of the versions.10 
 
Looking back in the early years, the drafting of laws in Rwanda was done in French and then 
translated to Kinyarwanda (Kinyarwanda is the local language spoken by most of the 
Rwandans), and thus the legislation was composed of two versions, namely, Kinyarwanda 
and French. From 2003, the Government bills are drafted   by lawyers of Legislative Drafting 
Unit in the Ministry of Justice. The Legislative Drafting Unit is composed of legislative 
drafters and translators.11 While the drafters draft laws, the translators translate them, and 
they have the duty to ensure harmony in all the three language versions. Translators of the 
Unit are lawyers and have to verify drafting issues as well.12 Various public offices also have 
legislative drafters and their draft bills are sent to the Legislative Drafting Unit in the 
Ministry of Justice for polishing up all the drafting versions.13 The bill is then forwarded to 
the Parliament in the three language versions aforesaid.14 
 
The Rwandan Constitution provides that the official languages are Kinyarwanda French and 
English.15 The Constitution provides that each Law shall be considered and adopted in 
Kinyarwanda or in the language of preparation in respect of any of the official languages. In 
                                                            
8 Dinah Shelton “The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties”(1996-1997) 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev, 
611,620 < htt://heinonline.org>. 
9  Antonin Scalia  “A Matter of Interpretation, Federal Courts and the Law” (1970)Princeton University 
Press,31< htt://heinonline.org>. 
10 R.A. Macdonald “Legal Bilingualism” (1996-1997)   42 McGill L. J, 126, 160 < htt://heinonline.org>.  
11 Vestine Nsanze “Challenges of Drafting Laws in One Language and Translating Them: Rwanda’s 
Experience” ( 2012) 46 the loophole. 
12 Ibid 
13 Nsanze (n 11)46. 
14 Organic Law N°06/2006 Of 15/02/2006 Establishing Internal Rules of Procedure of The Chamber of Deputies 
In The Parliament, Article 107. 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 04 June 2003 as amended to date, Article 5. 
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case of conflict between the three official languages, the prevailing language shall be the 
language in which the law was adopted.16 From this context, it would be easier for anyone to 
assume that the language version in which legislation is adopted is the one which is authentic. 
There is a ministerial ordinance however which provides that all draft bills are submitted to 
the cabinet for approval in three official languages.17 Irrespective of the fact that the draft bill 
may have been conceived in one of the three official languages, all the three versions have 
equal value.18 The authentic interpretation of Laws in Rwanda is done jointly by both 
Chambers of the Parliament. The Supreme Court has to give its opinion on the issue that 
needs interpretation. Authentic Interpretation may be requested by a Member of Parliament, 
the Government or by the private practice association known as the ‘Bar Association’. Any 
other interested person may request for authentic interpretation through a Member of 
Parliament or the Bar Association.19 This trend of statutory interpretation is quite rare. In 
most countries, statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the courts,20  
 
The success of an authenticated translation depends on its interpretation and application in 
practice. It is important to fore see the interaction between translation and interpretation of 
legislation. Unlike other jurisdictions which have interpretation Act, Rwandan legislature has 
not attempted to make any rules regarding the approach to the interpretation of multilingual 
legislation. Only one provision in the Constitution talks about the issue. This lacuna is 
nevertheless lessened by the fact that once interpretive rules are set, the judicial perspective 
may be impeded by the naive rules set to resolve conflicts between the equally authentic 
versions.21  
 
Beside multilingual natural complexities as well as those inherent in the clauses regulating 
interpretation, statutory interpretation in Rwanda is further complicated by blending Civil 
Law and Common Law. Assuming that a bill is drafted in English, English and Common 
Law are so much tied together that the terminology used exclusively belongs to Common 
Law. The draft bill is then translated to French and Kinyarwanda. French relates a lot to Civil 
                                                            
16 Ibid, Article 93.  
17 Instructions of the Minister of Justice n°01/11 of 14/11/2006 relating to the Drafting of the Texts of Laws, 
Article 3. 
18 Ibid, Article 4. 
19 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (n 15), Article 96. 
20 Mary Arden DBE, “The impact of judicial interpretation on legislative drafting” (2008) 5 The Loophole. 
21 Beaupre (n 7)161. 
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Law to an extent that a text as finally produced belong to civil law of France.22 For the lack of 
appropriate terminology related to English or French, the Kinyarwanda version is in most 
instances translated by a couple of words to match up with the meanings of words in English 
or French. Lack of appropriate terminology is also prevalent between English and French 
texts. The challenge directly emanates from interpreting legislation which is a blend the Civil 
Law and Common Law.23  As it is be discussed in the proceeding parts, the probability of 
inconsistencies in the three language versions is so profound that it would not be surprising if 
the entire piece of legislation would be subject repeal or amendment over the weight of 
inconsistencies.  
 
The aim of this paper is to prove that Ruth Sullivan’s theory on the factors of complexity of 
statutory interpretation in multilingual environment holds true in the case of Rwanda. The 
paper proves the hypothesis by applying the criteria set out by Ruth Sullivan in her article: 
‘Challenges of Multilingual and Multijural Statutory Interpretation’.24 They are; the Legal 
Status, Equal Authenticity, The Shared Meaning Rule and Application of the Shared meaning 
Rule. It suffices to note that there is no standard way of classifying the rules of statutory 
interpretation nor is there a standard way of ranking them.25 I have chosen to apply these 
criteria because they were developed primarily in relation to interpreting legislation in 
multilingual jurisdictions .Rwanda is one of the jurisdictions that use multilingual system of 
drafting bills and consequently publish legislation in three official languages. Sullivan used 
these criteria to show the complexities of interpreting multilingual legislation with special 
reference to Canada. 
 
Although Sullivan’s theory is about multilingual drafting environment, she has specifically 
used examples of Canada where drafting is bilingual and bijural. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, ‘multilingual drafting environment includes examples of bilingual drafting 
jurisdictions. 
 
                                                            
22 Donald L. Revell, “Bilingual Legislation. The Ontario Experience” vol 19 (1998) 1 Statute Law Review 32, 
38. 
23  Nsanze (n 11)50.  
24 Ruth Sullivan, “Challenges of statutory interpretation multilingual multijural legislation”(2003-2004)29 brook 
J Int’l L.993, 985,1005-1018  < htt://heinonline.org>. 
25 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (2nd Edn, Irwin Law Inc 2007)42. 
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The paper is Introduced by giving the broad problems which surround the process of 
multilingual interpretation. It introduces how statutory interpretation comes into play and 
who does what it in the due process. The paper then takes a quick look into the drafting 
history of Rwanda and the procedure of statutory interpretation. In order to fully understand 
the process by which bilingual legislation is authored, it is important to comprehend the 
larger picture of the entire legislative process in Rwanda. 
 
Part One talks about the Legal Status. It is further subdivided into two sub-parts. I.1 examines 
Relation between official and authentic versions. It seeks to analyze whether the official 
languages are consequently authentic versions of the legislation. 1.2 goes farther to establish 
the relationship between translation and legislated multilingualism. The fact that legislation is 
drafted in one language and translated into the other two languages in Rwanda gives rise to 
the question as to whether translated versions are legislated or not. Part 2 is about Equal 
authenticity. This part is subdivided into two sub parts. 2.1 analyses ambiguity in one version 
or two versions while other versions are clear citing some examples of the Rwandan 
legislation. 2.2 analyses the situation when the versions are clearly in conflict with an 
example from a piece of legislation. Part 3 deals with the Shared meaning rule. It is further 
subdivided into two.3.1 examines with instances of provisions of legislation the ambiguity 
shared meaning and how the interpreter ought to resolve it. And then 32 seeks to analyse the 
breadth versus narrow shared meaning. Part 4 is about the application of the shared meaning 
rule. This part analyses how the shared meaning rule is applied and the associated difficulties. 
It is followed by the conclusion, indicating the gaps and overlaps, thereby showing the 
inherent complexities that give way to challenges of interpreting multi-bilingual legislation 
with particular reference to Rwanda. 
 
So far, there has been no court case arising out of translation discrepancies of different 
versions of a piece of legislation. Nonetheless, as time goes, litigants become aware that they 
would get some advantages out of the discrepancies .It is thus a fact that must not be simply 
ignored as there may be cases of alleged discrepancies in the three language versions of 
legislation. For lack of decided cases on the issues of divergence of language versions, in as 
far as this paper goes; it does not make any reference to any case decided by Rwandan courts. 
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PART 1: LEGAL STATUS  
 
Whatever the legal status it takes in the multilingual perspective, it is appreciated that readers 
of the law refrain from the presuming that language precedes law and that language fully 
captures law.26 Readers of law authored in more than one language versions ought not to be 
transfixed by language or even examples drawn from certain language expressions.27 
 
1. 1: Relation between Official and Authenticity of Language Versions. 
 
While interpreting a multilingual legislation, it is crucial to establish legal status in terms of 
the official language and authenticity of language versions. The regulatory provisions which 
are contained the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda merely refines the important issue 
of the status of the official languages compared with the authentic languages. This concept 
generates debate of interest in the Rwanda case. Article 5 of the Constitution provides that 
there are three official languages;28 however it does not expressly recognise their equal 
authenticity. In fact article 5 of the Constitution per see does not distinguish between strong 
and weak multilingualism. That is to say, strong multilingualism where all official language 
versions of a law are equally authentic and weak multilingualism as where only one language 
version of legislation is authentic, the rest being official translations.29 The distinction is even 
more blurred since on the other hand, on the procedure of simultaneous interpretation, article 
93 of the same Constitution provides that in case of a conflict between versions, the language 
in which legislation was adopted prevails.30  
 
Reading from article 93, the authenticity of all the three versions is in question. The article on 
the face value suggests that interpretation must respect the version in which legislation is 
adopted. It seems to automatically deprive the official versions of their authoritative value 
before even the context of their provision is analysed.31 One cannot assert that all languages 
are official (equally authentic in other words) and then suggest that one of the versions shall 
                                                            
26  Macdonald (n 10) 128. 
27 Ibid 131. 
28 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (n15), Article 5. 
29 Theodor Schilling “ Multilingualism and Multijuralism: Assets of EU Legislation and Adjudication?” 
(2011)12 German L.J. 1462, 1463 < htt://heinonline.org>.  
30 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (n 15) Article 93. 
31 Beaupre (n 7) 159. 
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prevail in case of conflict.32 In some jurisdictions translation to several language versions 
may be for convenience and use with no legal force.33 Having one language prevail over 
others, which presumably serves to prevent inconsistency in the interpretation, would not be a 
true multilingualism as the versions in other languages may only exist as a reference rather 
than authentic.34  
 
The issue of Rwanda is unsettled because legislation may be adopted in a language which is 
not the one in which it was drafted. For example the law on gaming activities was drafted in 
English, translated into French and Kinyarwanda, considered and adopted in Kinyarwanda. 35 
There are two presumptions from the onset; one is that the language of conception is the 
authentic and the other that the language in which it was adopted is the authentic. Ruth 
highlights that others may be official subject to interpretation rule that gives paramount to 
one or more other languages.36 To a certain extent, it may be assumed that for the purpose of 
interpretation, official languages stand equivalent to the equal authenticity of versions and as 
stated in article 5 of the ministerial instructions.37 The analogy must be however treated with 
maximum precaution considering that equal authenticity is a principle by its own and it 
cannot be imposed by instructions.38 Equal authenticity of the different versions of the 
different language versions should be ratified at the constitutional level .Existence of articles 
5 and 93of the Constitution creates opportunity of forum shopping, where one litigant would 
argue that all languages are equally authentic on basis of article 5 of the Constitution. This is 
arguably an indication that the legislator intended to give equal authenticity of all versions of 
the legislation as they are enacted in Kinyarwanda, English and French. On the other hand, 
the other party may contest it on the basis of article 93 and challenge the authenticity of other 
versions. At the constitutional level inter se, there is no established hierarchy as all provisions 
are of the same footing as to priority, deference or other solution. It would therefore be 
difficult to apply any rule to resolve the conflict based on article 5 and 93 of the Constitution. 
  
                                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 Sullivan (n 24)1005. 
34  Revell (n 22)39. 
35 Article 40 of Law n°58/2011 Of 31/12/2011 Governing the Gaming Activities in Rwanda.  
36 Sullivan (n 25) 106. 
37  Minister’s Instructions ( n 17) Article 5. 
38 Shabtai Rosenne “On Multi-Lingual Interpretation” (1971) 6 Isr. L. Rev. 357 ,361 < htt://heinonline.org>. 
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In the essence of multilingual interpretation, it is of great importance to recognise availability 
of the three versions and establish the textual and contextual meaning of words.39 In reality, 
courts normally consult one version, that is the one in which it conducts its business.40 In the 
Rwandan context, courts most of the time consult Kinyarwanda version since many of the 
proceedings are held in Kinyarwanda. This may be dangerous because users are attempted 
not to consult other versions. Christopher B. Kuner explains that despite the New York 
Arbitration convention of 1958 containing several discrepancies between its five authentic 
texts, the review on the US leading cases which were construed on the basis of this 
convention do not make any mention on other versions other than the English one.41 In the 
case of R.v Compagne Immobiliere BCN Ltee, the Supreme Court of Canada disregarded 
Subsection 8(2) of the official languages act by describing it as a mere guide to interpretation 
because it collided with the constitutional clause on the equal authenticity.42 In a nut shell, 
there is no express provision determining the status of different three language versions in as 
regards their authenticity. 
 
1. 2: Relationship between Translation and Legislated Multilingualism 
 
Legislation in Rwanda is adopted by the Parliament in any of the three languages.43 Is this an 
implication that the other two versions are legislated? Apparently there is no clear provision 
which indicates whether all versions are legislated or not. Article 4 of the ministerial 
ordinance provides that translation must be done before a draft is submitted to the cabinet.44 
This is arguably an indication that all other versions that are enacted alongside with the 
language in which the legislation was adopted are equally legislated. This would seem to be a 
symbolic gesture. In other words, it implies that neither of the text takes precedence over the 
other, and any divergences between the three versions of the legislation are to be resolved 
according to rules of interpretation. 
 
                                                            
39 G.R Sneath, Bilingualism and Interpretation. Examples of Two Jurisdictions.(1984) Statutory Law Review 
London sweet and Maxwell ,49. 
40 Kuner (n 6)3. 
41 Ibid 2. 
42 Beaupre (n 7)160. 
43 Constitution of the Republic of Rwandan (n 15) Article 93. 
44 Ministerial Instructions (n 17) Article 4. 
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The most important issue is not whether one version is a translation of the other but whether 
all the versions are legislated and enacted by the Parliament.45  As far as most pieces of the 
legislation are concerned, this issue seems to have skipped the minds of drafters and 
legislators because the provision only refers to the language in which a given legislation was 
drafted and adopted. For example article 374 provides that “This Law was drafted in French, 
considered and adopted in Kinyarwanda”. 46 Should it then be assumed that the English 
version is not legislated? Article 107 of the internal rules of Chamber of Deputies states   that 
“Government bills sent to the Chamber of Deputies as well as their explanatory statements 
shall be written in the three (3) official languages recognized by the Constitution. The Bureau 
of the Chamber of Deputies distributes the bills to Deputies within seven (7) days from the 
day of their reception.47 And, article115 of the same internal rules provide that “the bill 
examined by the Committee is transmitted to Deputies in the three (3) languages recognized 
by the Constitution before the Plenary Sitting examines it”.48  
 
Apparently, most of the pieces of legislation do not make any mention of the language 
versions in which legislation is published. One can simply assume that all versions are 
legislated by the fact that they bear the signature of the promulgation figures. Some 
multilingual jurisdictions may provide for a version in which legislation is accented and 
published. For instance, in South Africa, statutes were alternatively signed in either English 
or Afrikaans, and signing of a particular version was matter of chance. 49 To resolve any 
conflict that would arise from such a situation, Section 35 of the 1983 South African 
Constitution,50 provided that “in instances of conflict between the English and Afrikaans 
versions of an Act, the copy signed by the State President (when he or she assented to the 
Act) prevailed.51 This constitutional solution was not however practical and courts usually 
applied the mechanism of comparing all versions of the statute to clarify each other, invoking 
the constitutional provision as a result resort.52 In the absence of the clause to determine 
which version prevails, the signed version may not carry more weight because it was signed. 
                                                            
45 Sullivan (n 24) 1006. 
46 Law N°21/2012 Of 14/06/2012 Relating To The Civil, Commercial, Labour And Administrative Procedure in 
Rwanda, Article 374. 
47 Organic Law N°06/2006 Of 15/02/2006 (n 14) Article 107. 
48 Ibid Article 115. 
49 Max Loubser “Linguistic Factors into The Mix: The South African Experience of Language and the Law” 
(2003-2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 127, 128 < htt://heinonline.org>. 
50 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1983 is abrogated by the Constitution of 1993. 
51 Loubser (n 49)128. 
52 Ibid 129. 
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Attempts are made and the texts are read together to establish the common denominator. To 
this far, since all the versions are regarded as complementing each other, all versions are then 
considered as legislated.53 
 
Another example is in the Canadian legislation, in the case of King v Dubois Justice Duff 
contended that  “the states of the Parliament of Canada in their French  version pass through 
the two houses of Parliament and receive the assent of His Majesty at the same time and 
according to the same procedure as those in the English version”. 54 In the same essence all 
legislations bear the signature of accent on all the three language versions in Rwanda. When 
we apply the Canadian and South African precedents to Rwanda, the assumption is that all 
the three versions of legislation are legislated. 
 
PART 2: EQUAL AUTHENTICITY 
 
When all versions of a piece of legislation are declared to be authentic, it means that the 
legislature recognises all versions as accurate statements of the law and the people it is 
addressed to can safely rely on any of the versions.55 The rule of equal authority carries 
symbolic significance. Theoretically, it ensures that none of the users of any language are to 
be considered as first class citizens while others are regarded as second class citizens. On the 
practical side of multilingualism, all versions equally contribute to the meaning of any given 
provision.56 The substantive effect of the rules is that all language versions of legislation are 
equally authentic and divergences in the language versions are not to be resolved by the 
predominance of one version over the other.57 The characteristic nature of equal authenticity 
is in most instances achieved by translating the version in which a piece of legislation was 
drafted into all languages and then declaring all translated versions to be authentic versions.58 
 
                                                            
53 Bernard Bekink and Christo Botha, “Aspects of legislative drafting: some South African realities (or plain 
language is not always plain sailing)”(2007) Statute Law Review, 15. 
<http:login.westlaw.co.uk.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk>. 
54  Beaupre (n 7)18. 
55 Pierre-André Côté  “Bilingual Interpretation of Enactments in Canada: Principles V. Practice” (2003-2004) 29 
Brook. J. Int'l L. 1067, 1069  < htt://heinonline.org>. 
56 Côté (n 55) 1069. 
57 Teresa Scassa, “Language of Judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada” (1994)( 43 U.N.B.L.J. 178 ,189 < 
htt://heinonline.org> . 
58 Jan Engberg. “Statutory Texts as Instances of Language(s): Consequences and Limitations on Interpretation” 
(2003-2004)29 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1135, 1154< htt://heinonline.org>. 
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In the Rwandan case like in other multilingual drafting jurisdiction, this is in line with 
keeping up with the rule of law so that people have access to the law they can read and 
understand in their own language or the language they feel at ease when reading.59 
Presumably, everyone would be able to know the legal consequences of their conduct and 
will not be unfairly taken by surprise.60 Despite the fact that legislation may contain special 
provisions, discrepancies still exist between the versions of legislation. It invites the question 
of attitude the interpreters are likely to adopt. 
 
2. 1: Ambiguity in one Version while other Versions Are Clear  
 
The Rwandan Constitution clearly regulated that the language in which legislation is adopted 
prevails over the other.61 We are yet to analyse what happens if the language in which it was 
adopted is ambiguous or vague. This position does not provide any solution as to what 
happens if the application of article 93 does not remove the ambiguity or give a meaning that 
reconciles all versions in regard to the object and purpose of the legislation.62 It is argued that 
where the degree of divergence of multilingual legislation is inevitable, then it is not proper 
for the interpretation to rely on solely a single language version, it would be ideal to compare 
several of them.63 When the text under consideration contains ambiguous provisions but the 
ambiguity can be resolved by referring to unambiguous words or expressions in the other text 
then the latter meaning can be adopted.64 When the meaning of one version is ambiguous and 
the other meaning is plain, the plain meaning is adopted. In fact this as a matter of 
constitutional law where all versions are equal, how can an interpreter reject the meaning 
found in both versions for the one that is found in one.65  This is what an interpreter of 
legislation may resort to if other means of resolving ambiguity cannot reach a fine 
interpretation. The interpreter opts for a clear version for the ambiguous version. 66  
 
                                                            
59 Jean Hardy “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties By International Courts And Tribunals” (1961)37 Brit. 
Y. B. Int'l L. 74 , 75< htt://heinonline.org> . 
60 Ruth Sullivan Some “Problems with the Shared Meaning Rule as Formulated in R v Daoust and The  Law of 
Bilingual Interpretation” (2010-2011) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 75 ,76 < htt://heinonline.org> . 
61  Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (n 15) Article 93.  
62 Georg Schwarzenberger “Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties” (1968–1969) 9 Va. J. Int'l L. 3 ,4 < htt://heinonline.org>  
63  Kuner (n 6)3.  
64 Spring Yuen-Ching Fung  Interpreting the Bilingual Legislation of Hong Kong(1997) 27 Hong Kong L.J. 206, 
218 < htt://heinonline.org>.  
65 Sullivan (n 24)1014. 
66 Côté (n 55)1071. 
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Equal authenticity of language versions means that all versions of legislation are equally 
official and authoritative enactments of the Parliament.67 By assuming that one of the 
multilingual versions is truly authentic and that others are mere translations or only for the 
purpose of reference, it simply defeats the principle of equal authenticity.68 The rule of equal 
authenticity means reconciling discrepancies among Kinyarwanda, English and French texts. 
It basically overrides the tendency of choosing to have one language version prevail over 
others.69 Equal authenticity in other words is an attempt to finding a solution to the problem 
of accommodating all languages spoken by the communities within a single political entity. It 
provides members of the communities with direct access to the law.  
 
The challenge lies into this fact, where the clear version is considered to clarify the 
ambiguous version; it undermines the linguistic security, one of the key functions which the 
equal authenticity ought to serve.70 Reconciling versions when one of them is clear while 
others are ambiguous is facilitated if the ambiguous text means the same thing as the version 
which expresses it clearly. That is to say, all versions read together, they   point to the one 
conclusion. Here are some examples. “Any instrument for house breaking” and the French 
version is “un instrument pouvant servir aux effractions de maisons” .71 The French version 
makes it clear. In English version an instrument for house breaking is one capable of being 
used for house breaking.72 The main idea here is to read one version in light of another and 
reconcile the versions wherever possible. In cases of clear and ambiguous versions involving 
litigants, if versions are equally authentic and it is not possible to reconcile them, courts are 
likely, especially in penal cases, to resolve it by giving effect to the version in favour of the 
defendant (accused). 73  
 
Article 3 of the Rwandan criminal procedure 74 is one of the examples of the ambiguity of 
version while another is clear. There is ambiguity in Kinyarwanda and English while French 
version seems to clear the ambiguity in other versions. Article 3 of the penal procedure, The 
                                                            
67 Sullivan  (n 60)76. 
68 Revell (n 1)1085.  
69 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (n 15) Article 93. 
70 Sullivan (n 61)82.  
71 Beaupre (n 7) 20. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ching Fung  (n 64)207  
74 Law N° 13/2004 Of 17/5/2004 Relating to the Code Of Criminal Procedure, O.G Special Nº Of 30/07/2004 
Article 3.,<www.amategeko.net> 
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English version reads: “A criminal action abates upon death of the offender, in case of 
prescription of offence, when there is amnesty, when a law is repealed or following a court’s 
final judgment on a particular offence. In case the law provides otherwise, the action can also 
be extinguished if the defendant accepts to pay a fine without trial or in case a complainant 
withdraws his or her claim”.75 
 
The French version can be translated as a criminal action abates upon death of the defendant, 
in case of prescription of offence, when there is amnesty, when a law is repealed or following 
a court’s final judgment on a particular offence. In case the law provides otherwise, the action 
can also be extinguished if the defendant accepts to pay a fine without trial or in case a 
complainant withdraws his or her claim”.76 The Kinyarwanda translates as; A criminal action 
abates upon death of the offender, in case of prescription of offence, when there is amnesty, 
when a law is repealed or following a court’s final judgment on a particular offence. In case 
the law provides otherwise, the action can also be extinguished if the defendant accepts to 
pay a fine without trial or in case a complainant withdraws his or her claim.77  
 
There is ambiguity in Kinyarwanda and English versions. English version cites offender and 
this term is a conceptual ambiguity. There is an indication that the conditions stated in the 
article would apply after conviction.  Kinyarwanda version also refers to “uwakoze icyaha” 
which translates to “offender” in English. The French however refers to “prevenu” which 
translates to the “defendant “in English. The English and Kinyarwanda versions at some point 
use the words “offender” and “defendant” interchangeably. On the proceding paragraph of 
both versions, the person is referred to as defender, and it makes us wonder if the word 
defendant and offender carry the same meaning.  
 
So how does the concept of ambiguity in one text while another one is clear help the 
interpreter to resolve this issue? There are two scenarios that led to this error. The legislation 
was drafted in French, translated to Kinyarwanda and then English. The English version in 
this case inherited translation error from Kinyarwanda where the word “prevenu” was 
translated from French to Kinyarwanda as “uwakoze icyaha” and then to English as 
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‘offender’. The other possibility is that it was translated from French to English. A translation 
error was made at this stage and then transferred to Kinyarwanda version.  What would occur 
in case of discovering an error or omission in the translated version .  If the reader chose to 
read the French version, there would not be any problem of ambiguity, but since all the 
versions are equally authoritative, other version have to be read as well. 
 
In this case, it is suggested that the clear version must be in reasonable construction of the 
unclear one. 78 While the English and Kinyarwanda version refer to the person as the 
offender, the conditions contained in the two versions are similar to those in French. From the 
general principles of criminal law, a person can be referred to as offender only after 
conviction; Offender is defined as a person who has been found guilty of an offence and is 
liable to punishment pursuant to criminal law.79 It actually competes with the principle of 
innocence presumption. The English and Kinyarwanda version clearly conflicts with the 
Constitution out right. It is in other words Un constitutional because one is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty.80  It would then be eminent that conditions of death, amnesty, 
repeal and the final judgement cease to apply. In light of comparing the unclear version to the 
context, then the second paragraph would be enough to suggest that the word is the 
“defendant” and not “offender” as it is the word used in the next paragraph and therefore the 
French version applies. This is in other words referred to as relative ambiguity, that is to say 
where ambiguity is in relation to certain facts.81 In principle the word offender would not be 
open to diverse meanings but the determination of the application of those words to particular 
circumstances82 gives rise to difficulties M. Beaupre says that “where possible, justified, one 
must attempt to extract a mutually compatible rendering. If that is impossible, the context 
naturally rules the inevitable choice of the version to be preferred”.83 When we apply article 
93 of the Constitution,84 it would mean that the Kinyarwanda version prevails because the 
penal procedure was adopted in Kinyarwanda.85 The Kinyarwanda cannot help to resolve the 
conflict because it undermines French version which is clear and carries the purpose of the 
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provision as well. It is a true reflection of the failure of the constitutional provision of 
predominance of one language over another. 
 
2.2: When Versions are Clearly in Conflict 
 
Rwanda’s Constitution provides for the case of conflict, but such solution may not be 
sufficient enough to solve language version divergence. From precedence the Vienna 
convention adopted a solution to this issue. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or 
more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides 
or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.86 Discrepancies 
in the meaning of all versions should be treated as any other ambiguity. In this situation none 
of the rules of the multilingual legislation would be applicable.87 Even though there could be 
three linguistic versions, the rule of interpreting them has to be based on particular facts. A 
choice has to be made in order to reach the relevant meaning of words used in the legislation.  
 
Any piece of legislation is drafted in a manner that aspires to have all versions mirror each 
other. In practice, the three versions are often open for different interpretations, a situation 
that can prove extremely problematic. It is not surprising to state that the complexity of 
multilingual statutory interpretation lies in the difference between or among the versions.88 
The general principle is to analyse the difference between expressions of the three texts since 
each version is capable of giving a different meaning from other texts. Any version chosen 
for interpretation takes into account factors normally relevant in ascertaining the statutory 
meaning.89 It is argued that the literal meaning in each of the three versions retains relevance 
and that the words used in all versions as interpreted will determine the semantic possibility 
of the provision.90 Pierre André Côté underscores that “the “ordinary or “textual” meaning, 
however, cannot be a factor in the selection of best interpretation because, in cases of 
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divergence, both versions being of equal weight, counsel other out as it were, at least at the 
textual level”.91 
 
It is possible that implicit and symbolic meanings of words in the version in which the 
legislation was originally drafted may be lost, ignored or compromised in translation to other 
texts. When equal authenticity is presupposed, it is challenging as to how the interpreter 
ought to react when other versions are a derivative translation of the other. 92 The challenge is 
aggravated by the fact that each of the versions says one thing different from another. The 
requirement for the equal authenticity is that all versions must equally express a single rule as 
intended by the drafter. When the versions express different but clear idea, from the drafting 
point of view, none of them is reliable. The basis other than the textual meaning has to be 
established in order to determine the version that is to be considered.93 When all versions of 
the multilingual legislation express clear but different meaning, the state has made a mistake 
and all the audience of the legislation are subject to the risk of being taken by surprise. The 
duty of resolving the clear words in conflict is not an easy one, yet the interpreter has the 
daunting task to minimise the surprise.94 Under such circumstances, the ambiguity is not 
within the versions but is rather caused by the divergence of versions.  It should be dealt with 
like any other question of ambiguity by seeking to ascertain the purpose of the provision.95  
 
Other thoughts suggest that such divergence should be treated by settled cannons of 
interpretation and construction. It is a presumption that the Parliament has spoken in more 
than one language with variance of meanings between versions. This presumption is however 
rebutted by the fact that it cannot apply when there is divergence between versions that are 
supposedly equally authentic.  Beaupre explains that “Once the court determines that each 
text is clear but at odds with the other, we are no longer speaking of equal interpretation. The 
language in question requires no interpretation; the law needs only to be applied. And the 
impossibility of applying two clear texts that are at odds with one another is the essence of 
the problem which, for its solution may seem to require a legislative act on the part of the 
judiciary”.96  It is a general understanding that when the courts are called upon to interpret a 
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statute, their main task is to discover the intention of the legislature. Whenever words used in 
legislation turn out to be clear and unambiguous, the interpreter should not be bothered of 
taking further steps to identify the legislative intent.97 
 
Arguments put forward for equal authenticity suggest that there is minimum impairment for 
linguistic equality. When resolving discrepancies between versions, it does not involve 
automatic preference of a version over another. All versions have equal opportunity of being 
picked up as the version that states well the legislative purpose. 98 One could simply apply the 
unilingual approach if there were no such discrepancies. But because they are present and 
unavoidable, the most prudent way is to consider all versions of the legislation. 99 Comparing 
all versions may facilitate interpretation since the presence of the three language versions 
increases the possibility that legislation may be interpreted in a way conforming to the 
legislative intent.100  
 
This attempt can however be realised if only all versions do state the same meaning, a 
condition that is realistically difficult to achieve.101 Discrepancies among these texts still have 
the potential to cause systematic problems.102 The plurality of authentic texts of legislation 
always carries its own intricacies when it comes to its interpretation.103 Equal authenticity is 
to be attained where one version equally reflects one another. However, different languages 
cannot cover exactly the same semantic area. Realistically, it involves mapping a language 
into another and the outcome is usually closeness, not particularly identical in meaning.104  
One of the complexities of equal authenticity rule is that an interpreter cannot know the 
legislative intent by merely reading one version of the law. The interpreter has to consider all 
versions and resolve discrepancies if any before deciding on how to apply it.105 To the extent 
where one is forced to read both versions to understand the meaning, linguistic security is 
undermined. When a person reasonably relies on a version that turns out to be inaccurate 
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statement of law, fairness is undermined.106  Example of when language versions are clearly 
in conflict is article 198 of the penal code which defines marital rape. 107  
 
English version reads: Marital rape is any act of sexual intercourse committed by one spouse 
on the other by violence, threat or trickery. 108 The Kinyarwanda version can be textually 
translated as, marital rape is any act aimed at sexual intercourse committed by one of the 
spouses without consent of the other by using force, threat or trickery.109 French version can 
be translated as; ‘marital rape is any act aimed at sexual intercourse committed by one of the 
spouses against another without consent of the other by using force, threats or trickery.110  
 
The Kinyarwanda and French versions refer to “any act aimed at sexual intercourse” the 
English version refers to “any act of sexual intercourse”. The English and Kinyarwanda or 
French versions do not correspond and the proposal to change any of the versions to conform 
to others would not bear any result that responds to resolving the divergence in meaning that 
is clearly expressed. On a general note, the drafter/translator did less to avoid the divergence 
in meaning and all versions ended up expressing different concepts.  
 
The major concern is that the Kinyarwanda and French version texts appear to be clear 
because they refer to acts aimed at sexual intercourse. The English is also clear but the text 
has its own meaning. If there is any ambiguity, it is because of the divergences in two 
versions, Kinyarwanda together with French against the English version which clearly 
expresses different meanings. We have multifaceted definition that is, versions that clearly 
state different forms of conduct, yet all versions are equally authoritative versions. Since the 
problems of interpreting legislation would not lie in the difficult to determine the meaning, 
but rather on how to implement the intended meaning of a provision,111 implementing the 
meaning of the given definition in divergent meanings is the main challenge  
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Although the definitions of terms are not to be limited to an equivalency of AB means A and 
B, it has to be taken into account even when it does fully be fit into the context. 112The absurd 
situation of unstable definition this article is aggravated by conflicting divergence of all the 
versions in an attempt to define marital rape. The problem arises because two versions 
compared to one version prescribe clearly contrasting forms of conduct. Here we have to 
examine a fact of two aspects conveyed differently by two language versions.  
 
When we apply the Kinyarwanda version because the initial drafting was done in 
Kinyarwanda as per article 764113 of the same code, the problem may be solved. But would it 
mean that the English version is undermined. The English version of is as well clear and the 
pure intention of the drafter be underplayed by this decision. We must pay attention to the 
fact that the Parliament has spoken in three languages with variance in meanings in which 
case all versions are to be considered as authentic versions of the legislation. Here lies the 
dilemma of interpreting multilingual legislation. Sometimes, definition of terms can create 
more problems than they solve. Interpreting from the internal context requires that meaning is 
determined from the ordinary linguistic usage including any special technical meaning and 
the purpose for which a piece of legislation is passed. 114The legal certainty in this case would 
not be achieved by application of article 93 of the Constitution. Elimination of linguistic 
discrepancies by the way of interpreting may in certain circumstances run counter to the 
concern for legal certainty.115 It is therefore preferable to explore the possibilities of solving 
the ambiguity at issue rather than employing the principle of one version superseding others. 
A consideration of purpose and context would help to settle the divergence between the 
versions. 
 
PART 3: THE SHARED MEANING RULE 
 
Multilingual interpretation presupposes that the method of reading and interpreting clauses 
necessitates that interpreter takes all language versions into account and assign the same 
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meaning to them all. It is presumed that the drafter intended the shared meaning.116 Absence 
of this approach results into de facto legal dualism, by pretending that legislation can be 
understood by referring to only one of the other versions of the legislation.117 It cannot be 
claimed to be a correct way of interpreting legislation if the other part of the legislation is 
ignored. Multilingual legislation requires multilingual interpretation. It means; an 
interpretation which puts into consideration all versions of a piece of legislation.118 In 
Rwandan jurisdiction, those include Kinyarwanda, English and French versions. 
 
3. 1: Ambiguity Shared Meaning 
 
This is termed as ambiguity shared meaning because one version lends itself to two or more 
possible meanings.119 Certainly, most of the approaches of statutory interpretation revolve 
around the problem of having the words of legislation capable of delivering more than one 
meaning.120 Consequently multiple approaches are used to determine the meaning of the 
ambiguous word or expression within the provision of the legislation. 
 
Shared ambiguity in the multilingual environment is more complex because almost every 
word is used in various senses and thus has more than one meaning. Any of the versions in 
multilingual environment can have different significations capable of multiple 
interpretations.121 Indeed, shared ambiguity in the context of Rwandan multilingual drafting 
is exacerbated by translating words which carries ambiguity within themselves to other 
languages. It results into a difficult approach if the shared ambiguity is not capable of 
reconciling all the versions. 
 
By attaching clear and precise communication to the same meaning, ambiguity can be 
avoided. But exact communication is possible only if there is one to one relation between 
term and a concept. Certainly, concepts do not coincide and they do differ from one language 
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to another.122 Translation of these differing concepts leads to the shared ambiguity in the due 
course. The matter subject to debate in this case is how far the interpreter of legislation goes 
in examining analysing the circumstances, including the history of the matter and tips on the 
drafting of the legislation.123 The ultimate step is to try and reconcile ambiguity of the 
versions within evolution drawn from the meaning of the entire legislation and the subject 
which it is intended to address.124 It requires that the interpreter evaluates the shared meaning 
from all the versions and compare it with the entire legislation and the general context in 
which it is meant to function.125 It is a multi-faceted approach task and places the burden on 
the interpreter. 
 
An example of the shared ambiguity is in article 32 of the Presidential Decree regulating 
road traffic.126 In English, Article 32 reads, “Except for local regulations or particular lay-
out of the areas, every vehicle or animal at stop or in parking must be pulled out to the 
side.....”127 In French, the version can be translated as, Except for local regulations or 
particular lay-out of the areas, every vehicle or animal at stop or in parking must be pulled 
out to the side version.128 The Kinyarwanda version can be translated as; Except for local 
regulations or particular lay-out of the areas, every vehicle or animal at stop or in parking 
must be pulled out to the side;...129  
 
The Kinyarwanda version translates exactly like French and English versions. There are two 
drafting errors involved. A vehicle or animal stops and parks, therefore any person driving a 
vehicle or pulling an animal is not supposed to abide by the instructions. It does not indicate 
a person under that situation. A litigant may simply argue that the regulation does not apply 
to persons but rather to vehicles or animals. The ambiguity is caused by words in the 
legislation construed with redundancy because it appears to have no subject. In fact there is 
no identifiable person on whom an obligation or restriction is imposed. Otherwise by stating 
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that a person who rides or drives... stops or parks near... Shall be fined to a certain amount 
would be a simple way to refrain people from stopping or parking in the prohibited or 
restricted areas. 
 
The drafter uses the word ‘vehicles’ in all the three versions which is a general term that 
refers to a class of things.130 The word vehicle is very wide and when used in a clause like 
this, renders it ambiguous. The interpreter would have to find out if the drafter intended to 
include new members of the class as they are discovered from time to time or intended to 
apply to specific types within the class of vehicles. If we are to say that a new member of the 
vehicle is invented later, we cannot possibly state that the new member could have been in 
contemplation131 at the time this provision was being drafted.  Jim Evans stated that 
although a car is certainly a ”vehicle” for the purposes of a rule of excluding vehicles from a 
park, there is no conclusive answer as far as linguistic conventions go to the question 
whether a toy motor car or a sledge or bicycle is included in this term.132 The use of the term 
vehicle in all the versions clearly lacks precision which in turn leads to difficulty in 
interpretation and consequently implementation.  
 
The provision does not indicate the subject, it only shows the object. Naturally, the reader or 
the audience of legislation is always trying to place a possible meaning that is to his or her 
advantage regardless the intention of the parliament. 133 The shared meaning rule states that 
where there is an overlap in meaning between the two language versions of a provision that 
are otherwise at variance, the meaning that is shared by both versions is to be preferred.134
The question is how this shared ambiguity helps us to determine how this error occurred and 
how it can be ironed out. In the complexity of interpreting multilingual legislation, there 
appear to be few general rules for distinguishing these meanings; the only approach is to 
examine the context of an ambiguous word or phrase.135 
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3. 2: Breadth Versus Narrow Shared Meaning  
 
It is referred to as breadth shared meaning when the meaning expressed by one version is 
narrower than the meaning expressed by the other and the narrow meaning is contained in 
the broader meaning.136 This is a moment in legislation where the meaning conveyed in the 
narrow version constitutes a subset of the broader version.137 It may as well include an 
overlap between the versions to an extent that the range of reference of one version is 
enclosed within the range of reference of another.138 
 
It is suggested that where one version conveys a wider meaning and another version contains 
a limited meaning that contains the legislator’s intent, it is better to adopt the limited 
meaning. The narrow meaning of the adopted version must in as far as it goes undoubtedly 
express the will of the Parliament.139 In other words, breadth shared meaning is a form of 
absolute conflict.140 This presumption seems to apply only in favour of the legislative rule 
based on the strict form of construction of the legislative expression. It is in this sense not 
easy to link the legislative intent to the narrow expression than to the broad one.141 When the 
interpreter chooses to stick to the narrow meaning, there is a possibility that it may lead to 
the narrow result compared to the substantial controversies surrounding the legislation.142
Where a version is capable of two or more meanings and one version corresponds to those 
meanings, common meaning prevails to the exclusion of the other alternatives. It is believed 
that such approach would only be proper when applied for bilingual legislations. It is 
questionable to restrict the common meaning that relies to a greater extent on one version 
where language versions are more than two.143 
 
Example of shared ambiguity is drawn from Article 55 of the law related to Children 
infected or affected by HIV /AIDS.144 The English version reads like ‘A child above the age 
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of 12 years has the right to consult an authorized professional medical doctor or a nurse and 
to go through medical examination notwithstanding the opposition or prohibition of his/her 
parents or guardian’. 145 The French version translates as ‘A child above the age of 12 years 
has the right to consult an authorized professional medical doctor or a nurse and to go 
through medical examination notwithstanding the opposition or prohibition of his/her 
parents or guardian’.146 The Kinyarwanda version reads; A child above the age of 12 years 
has the right to consult a government professional medical doctor or a nurse and to go 
through medical examination notwithstanding the opposition or prohibition of his/her 
parents or guardian.147 
 
The first question is to ask whether there is a discrepancy between these versions and surely, 
there is. The second question is whether this is a breadth and narrow shared meaning. In the 
first place, This provision has vague statements in all the versions. All versions provide that 
a child above the age of 12 may consult a doctor or a nurse. Literary, above 12 is 12+1. The 
meaning of 12 years and above has a plain meaning and is clear only in as far as its general 
applicability or usage is concerned but is vague in its specific application to particular 
circumstances. But was legislative intent meant to exclude a child who is only 12 years old? 
Here comes the ordinary meaning. The meaning of a word or phrase may be affected by the 
readers knowledge that he or she is reading a piece of  legislation which deals with a 
particular subject and aimed to solve a particular problem.148 In which case, every child of 
12 years and above may consult a doctor or nurse.  
 
On the part of broad versus narrow, the word government doctor or nurse is wide and varies 
according to context. The government doctor or nurse legislated in the Kinyarwanda version 
carries three meanings: a doctor or A nurse working for the government; a Doctor or nurse 
authorised by the government to practice; and the doctor or nurse authorised to consult a 
child. The English and French version also carries two meanings: the doctor or nurse 
authorised to consult a child, and the doctor or nurse authorised to practice. In other words, 
the word ‘authorised Doctor or Nurse’ as found in English and French versions is a subset of 
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the Kinyarwanda version ‘government doctor or nurse’. 
 
Kinyarwanda version carries interesting deference from English and French versions 
Kinyarwanda version refers to “umuganga cyangwa umuforomo w’umwuga wa Leta ” 
which translates as the government doctor or nurse that includes authorised nurse or doctor 
as found in French and English versions. The English versions refers to “authorised 
professional medical doctor or a nurse”, the Kinyarwanda version somewhat carries a broad 
meaning. The French version refers to “médecin agréé ou infirmier(e) ” which translates as 
authorised doctor or nurse. It carries ambiguous narrow meaning. The narrow meaning 
would imply that the doctor or nurse has to be granted permission to consult the child, in the 
absence of such permission it would be illegal to consult the child or a doctor or nurse who 
is authorised to practice may consult a child.  While the French and English versions are 
narrow, they are not precise and as a result not conclusive on the meaning of the authorized 
doctor or nurse.  
 
Article 68 of the same law provides that ‘This Law was drafted in French, considered and 
adopted in Kinyarwanda’.149 This may lead to assumption that the broad meaning in the 
Kinyarwanda version is a result of translation mistake, yet the French version that was 
translated also carried its own error. Taking into account what may have happened during 
the drafting process, the drafters of the French and English versions may have heard the 
word authorised but did not pay attention as to how the authorised applies. 
 
The Kinyarwanda version drafter may have simply misinterpreted the instruction and 
possibly thought that it is the Government doctor but was not careful enough to find out if it 
is doctor or nurse practicing in the government hospital or authorised by the Government to 
practice. What we are sure of is that there is some commonality to do with the government 
which is either a hospital or permission to practice. It is clear that neither drafter of any of 
the versions gave due consideration to the two concepts. The concept of commonality in this 
case would not guide us to establish how these two diverging situations occurred, in which 
case it fails the rule of shared meaning within the concept of broad and the narrow shared 
meaning. 
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If one may argue that the narrow meaning which is authorised in this case take precedence, 
it would not be enough to give a clear meaning. It is narrow in the sense of comparing it 
with the broad but is not precise to reflect the true legislative intent. If one reads all versions 
with a presumption that the language in which it was adopted prevails, they would not catch 
the drafter’s intent. If one reads with a presumption that the language in which it was drafted 
prevails, there is some reasonable cause that the drafter intended to mean the person 
authorised to practise as a doctor or nurse or a doctor or nurse authorised to consult the 
child.  
 
By adopting the breadth shared meaning, readers relatively understand that Kinyarwanda 
version would lends itself to two meanings, a doctor working for the Government, a doctor 
authorised by the Government. In fact the word government doctor or nurse is wide enough 
to include the authorised doctor or nurse.  In the contrast of clear versus narrow, the French 
and English versions lenders narrow but ambiguous meaning. There is no reason to presume 
that the narrow meaning is the one intended by the drafter. Assuming that the narrow 
meaning is contained in the broad meaning, adopting it would be appropriate. But if the 
narrow meaning contains ambiguity, readers of the narrow version cannot rely on it unless 
they compare it with the broad version. For the lack of evidence, we are at the verge of 
applying the broad meaning which we are reasonably certain that it will be accurate to some 
extent or apply the narrow meaning which we may have grounds to reasonably believe that 
it will deliver accurate results. We are actually gauging narrow versus broad at 50 percent 
each. 
 
Looking at this example, there is an indication that the shared meaning rule fails to carry in 
predictive value in as regards broad against narrow divergences.150 It would inevitably not 
make any sense to constrain judges to rely on the limited meaning if it does not deliver the 
legislative intent as well as upholding the rule of law. If three meanings are possible in 
Kinyarwanda version and two meanings are possible in French and English versions, it is 
difficult to determine which possibility is to be excluded. In fact, the broader version by 
definition may at times contain elements lacking in the narrow version. The overlap between 
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the versions does not provide a room for determining the shared meaning in the sense of 
broad and narrow. It would be inappropriate if it leads to a conclusion that denies the 
legitimacy of the judiciary or whoever interprets the law in a democratic society.151 From the 
interpretive view, it is absurd to premise around the narrow meaning. A contextual analysis 
would be paramount in order to determine who is an authorized doctor or nurse as well as 
the Government doctor or nurse. Note that neither the word authorised nurse or doctor nor 
the Government nurse nor doctor is defined in the definition of terms of the legislation.  
 
PART 4: APPLICATION OF THE SHARED MEANING RULE 
 
When a shared meaning can be established, it contributes as a factor in finding a solution to 
the interpretation. It cannot however be solely relied on and may be ignored if it does not 
reflect the legislative intent.152 In most circumstances when applied, only results into not 
more than what a random chance would predict.153 It has been suggested that the choice has 
to be made between the legislative intent and the meaning of words. In principle, there has to 
be a link between what the law makers intend and what the readers of the legislation 
perceives. 154 The application of the shared meaning requires fidelity of the shared meaning 
and consistency to the idea in the legislative versions as originally constructed.155 In the light 
of the shared meaning rule, the interpreter has to consider the provision in contest, taking 
into account the legislative intent and may go farther to policy concerns as well as external 
evidence. The interpreter may find that any of the versions was improperly drafted and 
prefer the version that corresponds to the factors of the legislative intent and policy issues. 
156 In that case the shared meaning may be rejected in favour of appropriate interpretation.  
 
The difficulty about this approach is that the word common meanings have several meanings 
attached to it. It may as well mean the common intent, that is to say, the common intent the 
legislators had in mind when the legislation was being adopted. Common meaning may as 
well entail all elements common to the versions.157 Each of the versions is likely to consider 
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a common meaning it attaches to a particular word as ordinary meaning in the light of the 
object and purpose of the legislation which may differ in all versions of a piece of the 
legislation.158 Moreover it does not provide for a point in time when an extraordinary 
meaning have to be attached to the word in the context of legislation. Common meaning is 
viewed as when a Legislature speaks in two languages in the same breath.  
 
It seems that the meaning which is common to both versions must be regarded as the 
legislative intent. The surplus on one side must be regarded as due to incautious 
expression.159 This rule has been basically developed to govern interpretation of 
multilingualism. In case where the versions of the legislation do not declare the same 
meaning, the meaning contained by all the versions is presumed to be the legislative intent. 
It is based on the assumption that all versions of the legislative text must declare the same 
law. The unanswered question then is, if the shared meaning must be adopted, there would 
be no purpose of looking at the legislative intent.160 Lord Reid in Westminister Bank LTD V 
Zang said, “ But no principle of interpretation of statutes is more formally settled than the 
rule that the court must deduce the intention of the Parliament from the words used in the 
Act . If those words are in any way ambiguous, if they are reasonably capable of more than 
one meaning or if the provision in question is contradicted by or is incompatible with one 
any other provision in the Act, then the Court may depart from the natural meaning of the 
words in question.161 
 
Salembier suggests that “one of the currently accepted interpretive approaches, known as the 
"shared meaning rule", is largely ineffective and potentially misleading”.162 He asserts that 
the shared meaning rule rests on a thin veneer of logic that does not withstand reasoned 
scrutiny. It does not provide coherent account for origins of linguistic divergences.163 It 
should be noted that shared meaning rule applies only when all the versions are equally 
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authentic. There is no such presumption in the case of one authentic version and an official 
translation.164 Arguments against the shared meaning rule allege that it is nothing other than 
a rule of convenience designed to reconcile the practice of all authentic versions of 
legislation.165 They forward that mandatory comparison of versions in search for shared 
meaning blocks the opportunity to rely on the meaning as may be found in one version that 
reflects well the drafter’s intent.166  
 
In multilingual environment, interpretation cannot end once a shared meaning is found. On 
the contrary, it has to continue until all legitimate evidence of legislative intent is 
exploited.167 Once the existence of the shared meaning invokes the presumption that favours 
shared meaning, it should turn into interpretive question as to "what is the best or most 
plausible meaning having regard to the purpose and context?" and would there be any other 
evidence as regards legislative intent that would ouster the presumption. The presumption 
would be taken as determinant if any other evidence for legislative intent and purpose does 
not hold or inconclusive.168 The common meaning must be drawn from the all versions 
compared to the entire enactment and the system in which it is intended to operate. If the 
preliminary common meaning is in clash with such system or with the enactment as a whole, 
then it is quite likely and reasonable that the court will have to reject it. It would not be a 
proper solution to the problem. The court will at least be persuaded to look elsewhere for the 
rational choice.169 
 
Reading from R Dickerson’s model of successful communication, it is imperative that the 
drafter and the audience share a common understanding of the common meanings of words 
in legislation. They must have a common understanding of ranges of meanings to certain 
words and how context limits meanings. It basically implies that in multilingual 
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environment, the common meaning of words must apply to all versions and those versions 
must have the same meaning, a task that may not be easily realised.170  
 
Shared meaning does not mean simple reproduction of words from the original version. It is 
rather the construction of words into another language version in a way that it carries the 
same significance as the other versions.171 Taking an example of the term ‘gender’ from the 
Rwandan Constitution, it is not easy to get its equivalent in Kinyarwanda and French. It was 
translated in Kinyarwanda as’ equality between women and man in development’ and in 
French as ‘genre’.172 The word genre then had to be ignored because it conveys a different 
meaning and was simply inserted in French version as “gender”.173 This is because what one 
language system conceptualizes in one way is not conceptualised in the same way in all 
other language systems. It is naturally sometimes impossible due to historically grown 
meaning to take a word or a phrase from one language and substitute the meaning in another 
language. 174 
 
In the Rwandan context of multilingualism, there is an underlying  risk for the Parliament to 
adopt the errors of translation, a situation which occurs when the legislation is drafted in 
English or French (currently, most of the business laws termed as ‘doing business’ are 
drafted in English and most of the labour  laws are drafted in French) .175  The laws are then 
translated to Kinyarwanda, to this effect using equivalent terms or words that deliver the 
same meaning is such a hassle. 
 
There have been arguments that similar/shared meaning does not exist. There is no 
presumption of shared meaning between the authentic and official translated versions in the 
first place. Secondary as soon it is established that the authentic versions present a difference 
in meaning, the presumption of the shared meaning ceases to carry any effect.176 It has been 
suggested that perhaps the biggest mistake when interpreting legislation to select any 
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preferred rule and then apply it to the exclusion of  all other rules. All that should be done is 
to consider relevant criteria in order to reach a balanced decision.177 If the shared meaning 
removes doubt due to lack of the necessary clarity or transparency required for the 
application of the law, it can be applied .It  must on the other hand be ignored if it is to lead 
to a situation where justice or fairness is to be stalled.178 Engberg believes that any legal 
interpretation that relies heavily on the fixed interpretive rules cannot in many instances 
achieve the basic requirements of justice without considering more subjective factors. An 
element of more free and subjective interpretation has to be invoked.179 
 
In the light of shared meaning rule, comparison of texts to get the shared meaning may on 
one hand help to resolve the ambiguity inherent in term or phrase used in one language, 
making clearer the intention of the drafter.180 On the other hand, lack of precise linguistic 
equivalents and differences in the legal systems and terminology make it difficult to have 
shared meaning in certain multiple language versions leading to conflicting interpretation of 
legislation.181 Just like Judges in the interpretation of multilingual treaties aim to apply the 
closest approximation of the parties shared expectations,182 the same should apply to 
interpreting multilingual legislation. Interpreters should strive to apply the shared meaning 
to the extent that it corresponds in the least to the closest expectation of the legislature and to 
the audience of the legislation. It is natural to think that citizens will read and observe laws 
in the plain meaning of the words in the legislation. 
 
It is worth noting that whereas supremacy of clear version over the ambiguous one is 
reasonably acceptable, the same cannot apply for the narrow version over the broad one. 
There is no justification as to why the narrow meaning should prevail over the broad if it 
does not fully embrace the will of the Parliament.183  Salembier proposed that courts should 
disregard the shared meaning rule and begin with the presumption of favouring clarity and 
interpret each version by applying “the standard techniques of statutory interpretation”.184
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He suggests standard techniques as, “looking to the purpose of the Act, its internal 
consistency and legislative evolution, and the relevant presumptions of legislative intent-to 
determine which language version produces the most coherent legislative scheme”.185 
The shared meaning rule may be for some reasons unacceptable or may be inconsistent with 
the provisions of the same sort. Corcoran and Bottomley rightly suggested that statutory 
interpretation cannot be divorced from general principles of justice and fairness.186 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
The wording of legislation is not an easy task and it becomes more difficult where more than 
one language is used to carry the legislator’s message. It consequently makes for difficult 
reading and interpretation.187 Realistically, multilingual legislation contains discrepancies in 
the meaning of different language versions which may either complicate or facilitate the 
interpretation.188 When coordinating the texts results into discrepancies in the meaning of 
different versions of legislation on one hand, it leads to an additional source of ambiguity or 
obscurity of legislation. On the other hand, when the meaning of terms is ambiguous or 
obscure in one language, but clear in another, the multilingual character of the legislation 
facilitates interpretation.189 
 
Some opinions are in favour of multilingualism in as regards the challenges of  statutory 
interpretation not only because the text has been pre-interpreted by the translator, but also 
the drafting errors may be easily checked, and the text becomes more understandable by 
comparison of different versions by Judges and Lawyers.190 In this situation, an unclear 
version is interpreted by reference to other versions and reconciled with them, and the clear 
version is preferred as the objective one.191 However, this solution cannot apply, when two 
versions are clearly in contradiction, and the ambiguity not arises from ambiguity in one or 
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other version of the legislation, but from the fact that the same versions say the same thing 
clearly but differently.192 On a whole it is inaccurate to assume that interpreting multilingual 
legislation in Rwanda or any other multilingual legislation can be catered for by equal 
authenticity or shared meaning rules. All rules of interpretation must continue to apply until 
all legitimate evidence of legislative intent can be fairly conversed.193 
 
Whichever way the interpretation provisions chooses to go, it is  suggested  that in any 
multilingual jurisdiction and particularly Rwanda, it is essential that the process used 
interpreting legislation be credible if all versions of the legislation are to obtain equal 
authenticity.194 Nevertheless, there should not be an explicit clause that a certain version 
must prevail. The reason being that it may not disclose the drafter’s intent or provide un 
ambiguity in which case any version that provides for such should be considered as it was 
the solution in the Vienna convention where article 33(4) provided for resolving any 
divergence in versions with regard to object and purpose of the treaty. 195 Some weight may 
be given to the language prevailing over others only if it is apparent from the ‘travaux 
prepartoires ‘ that it corresponds to the legislative object and purpose and that other versions 
are mere translations. Moreover the version which is preferred to prevail over others may 
lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.196 Some of the interpretation 
difficulties are inherent in the interpretation procedure regulated by articles 5 and 93 of the 
constitution.197 If equal authenticity has to apply, no need to regulate which version prevails. 
Preference of one version over another gives impression that the language which prevails is 
the source text for the true meaning and others are simply translations.198 It defeats the 
principle of equality of versions, if a Government acts in more than one language, then its 
acts should be taken as authentic in all the languages in which it acts.199 It is essential that 
interpretation rules are applied in a sense which seeks meaning that gives effect to the 
intended purpose.  
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The interpreter needs to strike a balance between the two systems considering that the 
country fundamentally relied on a Civil Law system and now moving to a hybrid system. 
R.A. Macdonald stated that “common law in French" is fatally compromised; and the civil 
law and the French language are intimately connected, such that the possibility of "civil law 
in English" is also fatally compromised”.200 The two legal traditions rest on a sophisticated 
view of the relation of language to meaning and in doing so, they hinder the smooth 
interaction and practice of multilingualism.201 There is an inherent difficulty in attempting to 
bridge the gap between the two legal traditions. The relativity of legal terms, the 
inconsistence of categorizations and classifications between different cultures of languages 
are distinguished at the level of terms and concept which comes with the complexities of 
statutory interpretation.202 Very often, creation of legal meaning takes place always through 
an essentially cultural medium of any given language.203  
 
Clarity and precision is paramount when translating a text from one language to another. But 
there is likelihood of using bound abstractions whose meaning is derived from social and 
cultural contexts. This may generate ambiguity especially where legal traditions are 
different, that is common law and civil law. 204 It is believed that persons speaking same 
language but from different legal system are prone to translational problems than the persons 
speaking different languages but under one legal system.205 The interpreters of legislation in 
Rwanda today are embedded in the legal culture that is not Kinyarwanda, French nor
English. A legal culture that is neither common law nor civil law, it is all of these combined 
together with the ambiguities and complexities surrounding each legal tradition.  
 
In as regards the interpretation of legislation by the Parliament of Rwanda, some scholars 
suggest that it is a prerogative of courts. According to Pierre –Andre Cote “The Canadian 
Parliament enacts legal texts, not legal norms”.206 In Rwanda, the legislature enacts 
legislation and interprets it.207 From the drafting point of view, this approach is 
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dysfunctional, because the legislature is not practically involved in application of the 
legislation. This procedure seems a bit more of being cyclical because it goes back to the 
legislator to ask them what they meant or desired when they enacted the legislation which 
must otherwise be embedded in the language of the statutory instrument. Perrel underscores 
that the legislators make the law and the interpreters discover it.208 He denotes that a 
democratic society should be governed by the rule of law. In principle, the legislature is 
there to make the law and then the judiciary finds the legislator’s intent about the law as 
expressed in the language of law.209 The norms should be constructed by the readers of 
legislation but not the legislature. Construction of legal norms in this case refers to 
interpretation.210 In any case, it provides opportunity for future reference on the decided 
cases instead of going back and forth to the parliament.  
 
Considering that Rwanda have not legislated much on interpretation is also a setback. 
Despite so many theories that have developed over centuries, it is worth noting that there 
seem to be a significant tension between practice and theory of statutory interpretation.211
“Legal process" school of legal theory which developed at Harvard Law School suggested 
that a coherent theory of statutory interpretation simply did not exist”.212 As a result, there 
may be no theory that is expected to be an accurate statement of what the courts would 
actually do with the legislation.213 It is argued that “Rules do not guide. Rules are always 
open to several interpretations. Which one we choose hangs upon the "disposition" of our 
community. It is entirely "arbitrary" how we choose to interpret the rule”.214 
 
As we conclude, we draw attention to some of steps that can be taken to lessen the 
challenges of interpreting the multilingual legislation in particular and quality of legislation 
in Rwanda. Significant steps have already been taken and other steps are underway to 
address some of the challenges discussed in this paper. 
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The Drafting and translation teams need to evolve to the point where the quality of 
translation is good enough so as to have all versions serve the equal authenticity purpose.  
Although translators are usually not to interpret the law, they need to know enough about the 
legal orders and the legal context in which the text is created.215 
 
Learning from the example of Canada, to avoid translational errors, co-drafting can be tried 
in Rwanda. In co-drafting English and French drafters are brought together in Canada.216 In 
Rwanda where drafting is in three versions, it may involve either there drafters who are 
fluent in each language or two drafters because the Kinyarwanda language is understood by 
most of the drafters and translator .Where co-drafting may not be possible, the drafter and 
translator work together in close proximity to each other in order to reduce divergent 
meanings, ambiguity and vagueness.  
 
Another one is trainings in both Common Law and Civil Law systems in order to avoid the 
clash.217 Since translation demands precision and certainty, it is possible to derive from 
meaning from changing cultural and social context which generate ambiguity especially 
when legal traditions are different from each other.218 Quality in legislation requires training 
in drafting and in research skills.219 Lawyers trained and skilled in drafting discipline are not 
many in all the drafting departments. Lack of drafters who are knowledgeable on both civil 
law and common law basic concepts may lead to legislation that appears to be as serving 
two masters simultaneously with a cautious omission to state which legal system is meant to 
be served by which version.220 It implies that there is urgent need to train drafters in both 
common and civil law. 
 
Another solution may come with the Revision of the article 93 of the Constitution which 
regulates interpretation. English or French in Rwanda are often used like in many African 
countries to draft laws. These languages are very difficult to translate into plain language of 
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a particular local language (Kinyarwanda). Thus the Kinyarwanda version which is 
seemingly resorted to in case of conflict carries most of the translation quibbles.221 The 
degree of divergence may depend on a number of reasons, some of which include the 
distance between languages and cultures,222 reviewing article 93 of the Constitution to 
resolve the problem of predominance of one version over the others and thus the language 
that carries a clear reflection of the legislative intent would prevail. 
 
At the end of the day, multilingual interpretation is very challenging and all the rules 
developed to this effect carry deficiencies with them. to sum it up, I a agree with Dreidger 
“There is only one rule in modem interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the 
meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the 
consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of 
interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider 
and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After 
taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An 
appropriate interpretation is one which can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, 
its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy ,that is, its promotion of the 
legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just”.223 
 
Multilingual legislations are good for interpretation where one version is helpful to interpret 
another and disastrous if one version raise doubts about another as echoed by the saying  “A
person with one watch always knows what time it is. A person with two watches is never 
sure."224I have analyzed Ruth’s theory on application of rules of interpretation developed by 
scholars for multilingual legislation applying them to Rwandan context. In the instance of 
the clear and ambiguous version, it works, but in other three, it did not work. The examples 
given are a clear indication of challenges of statutory interpretation in multilingual 
environment. The theory of interpreting multilingual legislation carries complexities 
particularly in Rwanda, and in other multilingual jurisdiction.  
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